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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The names of all parties to the proceeding in the lower court are set 
forth in the caption of the case on appeal. J.R. Simplot Company is not 
involved in this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order dated October 6, 1993, granting a 
summary judgment in favor of Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter 
referred to as "Savage") which required Bruce A. Boyd (hereinafter referred to 
as "Boyd") to indemnify and defend Savage against Boyd's claims presented in 
the complaint below, and against the plaintiffs' claims in a related action 
Robert J. Kane, Jr. and Beverly Kane v. J. R. Simplot Company and Savage 
Scaffold & Equipment Inc., pending in the United States District Court of 
Utah. An order of the Third District Court dated May 25, 1994, directed that 
its October 6, 1993 order be considered a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and determined that the claims for 
indemnification against Boyd are separate and distinct from all pending 
claims. (R. 178-179) The trial court's order is appealed as of right pursuant to 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Savage on the grounds that the form small print indemnity clause 
found on the back of the scaffolding Rental Delivery not only released Savage 
from liability for its own negligence, but also required Boyd to pay all costs of 
defense and indemnification for any claims arising out of the use of the rented 
equipment. 
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Standard: "To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence, 
admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the [non-
moving party], must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and 
that the [moving party] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Such 
showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable possibility that the 
[non-moving party] could win if given a trial." Frederick May & Company v. 
Dunn, 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962). 
Summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, depositions, 
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The district court 's conclusion of law is reviewed for correctness by the 
appellate court. State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990). 
"Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, no deference 
is due the trial court's determination of the issues presented." Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Plaintiff/appellant Boyd appeals from a summary judgment entered 
against him and in favor of defendant/appellee Savage which determined that 
a "defend and indemnify" provision in a document Boyd initialed when he 
picked up rental scaffolds not only bars Boyd's claim against Savage but also 
requires him to pay all of Savage's defense costs and attorney's fees in this 
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action and a pending U.S. District Court action, Kane v. Simplot, to which 
Boyd is not a party. 
Boyd was hired by J . R. Simplot Company (hereinafter referred to as 
"Simplot") to paint a silo owned by Simplot. Boyd, who sometimes contracts 
to do painting and had done business with Savage in the past, picked up the 
scaffolding from Savage and initialed a document entitled Sky Climber Rental 
Delivery (hereinafter "Rental Delivery", a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A"), which contained a hidden defend and indemnify "agreement." 
Boyd and a fellow worker, Robert J . Kane, Jr. , were seriously injured 
when the scaffolding failed and they plunged 60 feet to the ground. Boyd 
brought this action claiming that Savage negligently failed to direct, instruct 
and warn him adequately with respect to the use of the scaffolding equipment. 
Robert Kane and his wife filed a similar action in U.S. District Court. 
Savage answered and counterclaimed on July 2, 1993. It denied liability 
and asserted tha t the rental agreement Boyd initialed contained an 
indemnification clause, having the effect of barring all of Boyd's claims 
asserted against Savage in the present action and requiring Boyd to 
indemnify it for any liability on the claims asserted by Robert and Beverly 
Kane against it in the U.S. District Court action. In addition, Savage asserted 
that the indemnification clause required Boyd to pay all costs and attorney's 
fees incurred by Savage in defending both actions 
The indemnification clause at issue is found hidden in Savage's 
standardized form Rental Delivery in fine print inside a two-sheet document 
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which is sealed closed at the top and the bottom of the sheets . The 
indemnification clause can only be reviewed if the sheets are separated by 
tearing off a perforated strip at the bottom. It is difficult to read and is 
crowded onto the page with 24 other technical provisions. 
When Boyd picked up the scaffolds, a representative of Savage inspected 
the equipment and reviewed with Boyd the "suspended scaffold pre-operation 
check-off list" set out on the back, or outside, of the joined sheets of the 
Rental Delivery. The indemnification clause is not found on the pre-operation 
check-off list, which is much easier to read, has larger print and is accessible 
without separating the sheets. The check-off list is on the outside of the 
sheets in plain sight and is much more noticeable than the 25 technical 
provisions, including the indemnification provision. The Savage employee 
reviewed only the check-off list with Mr. Boyd. 
On August 12, 1994, Savage moved the court for summary judgment 
requiring Boyd to defend and indemnify Savage in both this and the U.S. 
District Court actions and to pay all attorney's fees incurred as a result 
thereof. That motion was opposed by Boyd. The trial court reviewed the 
memoranda and heard argument on September 13, 1993. The court received 
supplemental memoranda on September 15, 1993. The trial court determined 
that there was "no evidence that the scaffolding was leased on a take-it-or-
leave-it bas is or tha t plaintiff occupied a disadvantageous bargaining 
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position" and ruled in its minute entry of September 16, 1993 in favor of 
Savage. A court stamped copy is attached as Exhibit "B". l 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 24, 1993, Boyd's attorney, Daniel Gibbons, filed a 
complaint against Savage and Simplot. (R. 2-9) 
2. Boyd's second cause of action sounded in negligence against 
Savage. Boyd alleged that Savage was negligent in the design and the 
selection of the equipment rented and sold to Boyd. Boyd further alleged that 
Savage was negligent in failing to adequately direct, instruct and warn Boyd 
of the inherent dangers and the proper method for and use of the swing stage 
and equipment. (R. 7-8) 
3. On July 2, 1994, Savage filed an answer and counterclaim against 
Boyd. (R. 38-45) 
4. Savage's counterclaim sought indemnification from Boyd based on 
the Rental Delivery document initialed by Boyd which contained an 
indemnification clause. (R. 43-44) 
5. On July 21 , 1993, Boyd filed a reply to Savage's counterclaim. (R. 
26-30) 
6. On August 12, 1993, Savage filed its motion for summary 
judgment (R. 63-64), and its memorandum in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 65-76) 
This document was not included in the indexed record. 
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7. On August 27, 1993, Boyd filed his memorandum in opposition to 
Savage's motion for summary judgment. (R. 86-91) 
8. Boyd had rented equipment from Savage on approximately 15 
occasions. (R. 92) 
9. The Rental Delivery has always been filled out by Savage 
employees. (R. 93) 
10. On May 17, 1991, when Boyd signed the Rental Delivery, a Savage 
employee told him where to initial the form. (R. 93) 
11. Boyd was not instructed to read or review any of the provisions 
on the Rental Delivery. (R. 93) 
12. Boyd was never told there were additional contract terms on the 
back of the sheets of the form. (R. 93) 
13. Boyd never had a discussion with anyone at Savage in which the 
indemnification provisions of the Rental Delivery were addressed. (R. 93) 
14. Boyd was told by Savage employees that the Rental Delivery 
stated that if he lost or damaged the rental equipment he would be required 
to replace it. (R. 93) 
15. There was no other discussion regarding any of the terms on the 
Rental Delivery. (R. 93) 
16. The Rental Delivery initialed by Boyd on May 17, 1991, appeared 
to Boyd to be a form contract. (R. 93) 
17. There was no discussion of the terms on the front or back of the 
Rental Delivery. (R. 93) 
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18. The copy of the Rental Delivery Boyd received consisted of two 
sheets. The sheets were joined at the top and bottom. The two sheets Boyd 
received consisted of sheets 3 and 4 of a four-sheet form. (R. 93) 
19. In the lower court, Boyd set forth the following "Statement of 
Facts" in his Memorandum in Opposition. 
1. Paragraph 6 of the defendant's s tatement of 
facts is incorrect. The initialing on the front of the 
defendant's form rental agreement does not indicate that 
the plaintiff read and agreed to the indemnity provision of 
paragraph 15. The initialing is in regard to paragraph 16. 
(See rental agreement.) 
2. The rental agreement is a form contract prepared 
by Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
as "Savage") without input from or negotiation with the 
individuals to whom they rent equipment. 
3. The plaintiff never had a discussion with any 
individual at Savage with regard to the terms of the 
indemnity provision found on two of the back sheets of the 
four page contract. (See Boyd's affidavit, paragraphs 9 and 
11.) 
4. The indemnity provision is not clearly presented 
to the renter of the equipment in that it is hidden on back 
sheets inside the four page document. (An exemplar of the 
contract will be brought for the court's review at the time of 
the oral argument. The defendant has refused to provide 
additional exemplars to the plaintiff.) 
In its Reply Memorandum, Savage objected only to paragraph 3, stating: 
Savage objects to plaintiffs statement of facts as contained 
in his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Specifically, Savage objects to the 
following paragraphs as numbered by plaintiff. 
Paragraph 3. Savage objects to this statement of fact as 
wholly irrelevant, such being extrinsic, parol evidence which 
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should not be considered by this court as will be discussed 
more fully below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Savage is attempting to enforce an onerous "defend and indemnify" 
provision. Not only is the provision oppressive, it is difficult to locate and 
read. The provision is within a Rental Delivery document prepared by Savage 
and apparently the Scaffold Industry Association. The terms can be found on 
the back sheets within the "sealed" document. The printing on the back sheets 
which contain numerous provisions crowed together are nearly illegible. 
When the facts and inferences surrounding Boyd's initialing of the 
Rental Delivery are viewed in the light most favorable to Boyd, sufficient 
evidence exists to find that the adhesion type Rental Delivery was presented 
to Boyd in a take-it-or-leave-it manner and that Boyd, when compared to 
Savage, was the weaker party. Boyd had no opportunity to negotiate the 
terms which Savage desires to force upon its customers. Certainly, the "defend 
and indemnify" clause was not assented to by Boyd and should not be 
enforced against him. 
The provision in question should not be enforced against Boyd because 
of its oppressive and overreaching terms and especially in light of the 
deceptive manner in which Savage is attempting to bind its customers. 
Unconscionable terms which unfairly surprise the consumer are not 
enforceable. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDEMOTFICATION CLAUSE HIDDEN WITHIN THE RENTAL DELIVERY 
DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE PARTIES1 "CIRCLE OF ASSENT" 
AND IS NOT ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE CUSTOMER 
At the time Boyd rented the scaffolding equipment that failed, he was 
one of Savage's many customers. His own business was a sole proprietorship 
and Boyd was the only employee. At the time the scaffolding failed, Boyd and 
Robert Kane were the only workers on the job. (Amended Complaint of Kane 
v. Simplot and Savage attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and cited by Savage in 
its memorandum supporting its motion for summary judgment.) 
It is very important for this court to closely examine an actual exemplar 
of the Rental Delivery. 2 It is a four sheet document used by Savage as an 
equipment discharge sheet and a suspended scaffold pre-operation check-off 
list. The first sheet is blue, the second sheet is green, the third is yellow and 
the back sheet is white. The blue and green sheets are retained by Savage and 
two yellow and white sheets are given to the customer. The blue and green 
sheets are joined to the yellow and white by a "glue" and are easily peeled off. 
The yellow and white sheets are joined together at the bottom and the top and 
cannot be separated (and the back cannot be read) without tearing off a 
perforated strip at the bottom. The first blue sheet that Savage keeps is 
2
 Boyd desires to attach an exemplar of the Rental Delivery in the appendix. Savage submitted such an exemplar to 
the trial court. (R. 109-112) Savage has refused Boyd's request to produce sufficient exemplars to this court so that 
each judge deciding this matter may have an exemplar for his or her personal review. Accordingly, Boyd has attached 
an exemplar in his original appendix and photocopies in the copies of his appendix. The Rental Delivery has two-
sided print and the deceptive nature of the document cannot be appreciated merely from photocopies. The 
photocopies in the record, however, do show how difficult the back side of the sheets are to read which contain the 
indemnification clause. 
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identical front and back to the first yellow sheet given to the customer. The 
front of each h a s the words "Lessee will defend and indemnify Lessor 
(paragraph 15)". Paragraph 15, however, cannot be found without tearing off 
the perforated strip, and once it is found, it is difficult to read. The pages are 
very thin and the information provided on the front sheet of pages 1 and 3 is 
printed on a much heavier type set than the information provided on the back. 
Of course, the indemnification clause is only found on the back sides of sheets 
1 and 3. The print on the front of sheets 1 and 3 bleeds out the information, 
including the indemnity clause, on the back of those sheets. 
Without removing the perforated strip, and there are no instructions to 
do so, the check-off list appears to be the only item on the "reverse side" of the 
Rental Delivery. The Rental Delivery lacks the most fundamental of contract 
provisions. There is no mention of the length of time the rented equipment 
will be in possession of the customer, no hint as to of the method of payment, 
if any, and no indication of the price of the rented or purchased equipment. It 
can hardly be said that the Rental Delivery is a contract setting forth the 
parties' completed agreement. 
It is well recognized that companies such as Savage use pre-printed form 
documents to take away the bargaining power of their cus tomers . 
Additionally, oppressive terms, such as the indemnification clause in question, 
are frequently hidden on the back sheets, in fine print and on paper which 
makes the printing nearly illegible. There can be little doubt that Boyd would 
not have agreed to indemnify and defend Savage against any claims relating 
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to Savage's negligence or even products liability, arising out of Boyd's proper 
use of the scaffolding equipment. Section 211 of the Restatement of Contracts, 
Second, addresses oppressive conditions hidden within pre-printed 
standardized forms. Paragraph 3 of Section 211 states: 
Where the other party has reason to believe that the party 
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that 
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part 
of the agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) Comments b and f of Section 211 are particularly 
instructive when considering the case at hand. Comment b states in part: 
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of 
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to 
understand or even read the standard terms. One of the 
purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over 
details of individual transactions, and that purpose would 
not be served if a substantial number of customers retained 
counsel and reviewed the s tandard terms. Employees 
regularly us ing a form often have only a limited 
understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary 
them. Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or 
even read the standard terms. 
Comment f states in part: 
Although customers typically adhere to s tandardized 
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing 
to know the standard terms and details, they are not bound 
to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable 
expectation. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Karl Llewellyn in a discussion regarding the notion of assent as applied 
to a standardized form stated: 
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boilerplate clauses, we 
can recognize that so far as it concerns the specific, there is 
no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, 
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specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type 
of the transaction, and but one thing more, that one thing 
more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not 
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his 
form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms. 
K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, 370 (1960). The terms that Savage is 
trying to enforce upon Boyd are unreasonable and indecent. They clearly alter 
the "reasonable meaning of the dickered terms." 
The affidavit of Boyd is in the record without rebuttal. (R. 92-94) At the 
time the Rental Delivery was initialed by Boyd and checked by a Savage 
employee, the only terms appearing on the Rental Delivery were the quantity 
and identification of items to be rented and purchased. The Rental Delivery 
does not fully set forth the agreement between the par t ies . The 
indemnification provisions of the Rental Delivery were not discussed by Boyd 
and the Savage employee. (R. 93) In fact, the only terms on the Rental 
Delivery that were discussed were the provisions that Boyd was responsible 
for lost or damaged rental equipment. (R. 93) Boyd was given sheets 3 and 4 
of the Rental Delivery and those sheets were sealed at the top and the bottom. 
(R. 93) 
In Weaver v. American Oil Company, 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E. 2d 144 
(1971), a lease by an oil company to an individual was reviewed. The lessee 
signed the lease without reading it. One of its provisions required the lessee 
to indemnify the lessor for damages caused by the lessor's negligence. It was 
held that the lessee was not obligated to read the lease because "the clause 
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was in fine print and contained no title heading ... ." Id., at 462, 276 N.E. 2d 
at 147. The court went on to state: 
The party seeking to enforce such a contract has the burden 
of showing that the provisions were explained to the other 
party and came to his knowledge and there was in fact a 
real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an 
objective meeting. 
Id. at 464, 276 N.E.2d at 148. In the case at hand, there was no real and 
voluntary meeting of the minds between Boyd and Savage. The Rental 
Delivery can hardly be considered to be a contract between the parties with 
the omission of the most basic terms necessary for a rental/sales agreement, 
and it is clear that the language of the indemnity clause was not brought to 
Boyd's attention. 
In the case of Parton v. Pirtle Oldsmobile - Cadillac - Isuzu, 730 S.W.2d 
634 (Tenn. App. 1987), the court examined the "efficacy of an exculpatory 
provision in a pre-printed automobile repair order signed by the owner of the 
automobile." Id. at 635. The automoble owner sued an automobile repair shop 
for the shop's alleged negligence in allowing the automobile to be stolen. The 
exculpatory provision in Parton is less offensive than the indemnification 
clause at issue here when the location of the terms in the document and the 
extent of the obligation imposed on the customer are compared. The Parton 
clause is found on the front of the repair order immediately above the 
customer's signature, while the Savage clause is hidden within the sealed 
portion of the document. The Parton clause merely attempts to relieve the 
repair shop from liability for its own negligence while the Savage clause 
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at tempts to bar liability and add the affirmative duty of defense and 
indemnity for all claims, including third-party claims. 
In its decision, the Parton court set forth the modern doctrine of fair 
play to be applied in contract interpretation and in the determination of the 
"circle of assent" which contains the agreement of the parties. One of those 
authorities cited stated: 
It mus t be emphasized that the assent analysis is not 
premised upon the actual assent of the parties. Parties to a 
contract rarely consciously advert to any number of terms 
which are binding upon them. If such terms allocate the 
risks of the bargain in a manner which the parties should 
have reasonably expected, they are enforceable — they are, 
to use the expression of Karl Llewellyn, 'decent' terms. If the 
terms of the contract suggest a reallocation of material risks, 
an attempted reallocation may be so extreme that regardless 
of appearance and genuine assent, a court will not enforce 
it. However, in less extreme situations, the parties may 
reallocate the risks of their bargain and such a reallocation 
will be judicially sanctioned if there is both apparent and 
genuine assent to it The parties will not be found to have 
agreed to an abnormal allocation of risks if the only 
evidence thereof is an inconspicuous provision and the 
boilerplate of the s tandard form. At a minimum, the 
reallocation must be physically conspicuous. Beyond that, 
it must have been manifested in a fashion comprehensible to 
the party against whom it is sought to be enforced. Finally, 
such party must have had a reasonable choice in relation to 
such reallocation. Absent these safeguards, the reallocation 
must be disregarded by courts since to enforce the provision 
evidencing it would be to enforce an 'indecent' provision. 
The provision is raised to the level of decency only if the 
party against whom it will operate has apparently and 
genuinely assented to be bound thereby. 
Id. at 637, citing J. Murray, On Contracts, §352-353, 2d Rev. Ed. (1974) 
(italics in original). 
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Requiring Boyd to be responsible for the negligent acts of Savage which 
resulted in injuries to Boyd and Kane is an "abnormal allocation of risks." 
Additionally, t ha t abnormal allocation of r isks is only found in an 
"inconspicuous provision in the boilerplate of the standard form." Parton 
requires that the indemnification clause at issue be (1) physically conspicuous, 
(2) manifested in a fashion comprehensible to Boyd and (3) give Boyd a 
reasonable choice in relation to the reallocation of risk. None of the three 
requirements is met in this case. 
II 
THE UNBARGAINED-FOR TERMS OF THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE ARE 
UNCONSCIONABLE AND SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED 
It is common knowledge that the detail provisions of standardized 
contracts are seldom read by consumers. Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 
992 (Colo. 1986). It is also well-recognized by courts and commentators that 
companies such as Savage attempted to hide oppressive clauses in a prolix 
printed form drafted by that company. As a result of such practices, the courts 
have developed the doctrine of unconscionability. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
'Unconscionable' is a term that defies precise definition. 
Rather, the court must assess the circumstances of each 
part icular case in light of the twofold purpose of the 
doctrine, prevention of oppression and of unfair surprise. 
Recognition of the purposes has lead to an analysis of 
unconscionability in terms of 'substantive' and 'procedural' 
unconscionability. 'Substantive unconscionability' examines 
the relative fairness of the obligations assumed. 'Procedural 
unconscionability' focuses on the manner in which the 
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contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the 
parties. 
Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company, 706 
P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). When a claim for unconscionability is raised, 
this court will "examine the facts ... in the light of the purposes of the 
unconscionability doctrine, i.e., prevention of oppression and of unfair 
surprise.' " Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah App. 1988). 
PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY 
"While unconscionability is ultimately a question of law, numerous 
factual inquiries bear upon that question." A. & M. Produce Co. v. F.M.C., 186 
Cal. Rptr. 114, 123 (App. 1982). The trial court determined that there was no 
evidence, one way or the other, regarding the Rental Delivery being presented 
in a take-it-or-leave-it manner or tha t Boyd was in a disadvantageous 
bargaining position with Savage. (Exhibit "B") That determination by the 
lower court, standing alone, should require this case to be remanded so that 
such facts could be discovered. 3 An examination of the Rental Delivery and 
the unrebut ted affidavit of Boyd clearly shows that Boyd was "unfairly 
surprised" by the terms of the indemnification clause. Boyd was totally 
unaware of that clause at the time the blanks on the Rental Delivery were 
3
 Moreover, the fact that Savage presents an elaborate printed form to its customers, deals with individual customers 
such as Boyd, and uses the Rented Delivery to educate its customers in the use of the scaffolds and to embody many 
other contractual terms that appear necessary in such a business — all show that the lower court was wrong: there is 
some evidence from the circumstances of this transaction itself from which it can be inferred that Savage's employees 
could not bargain with the "defend and indemnify" provision and that Boyd had to take it or leave it. If such an 
inference is at all reasonable, it must be drawn on a motion for summary judgment, see e.g., Frederick May & 
Company v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962). 
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filled out and there was no real negotiation over the terms hidden in the 
Rental Delivery. 
In the A &MProduce case, the court examined a contract for the sale of 
a weight-sizing machine. The consumer was a large scale Imperial Valley 
farming enterprise. When the consumer purchased the machine, it signed a 
contract which contained a warranty disclaimer. The disclaimer appeared "in 
the middle of the back page of a long pre-printed form contract which was 
only casually shown" to the consumer. Id. at 124. The consumer never read 
the warranty disclaimer and the disclaimer was never pointed out to the 
consumer by the seller. The contract terms were standard and the consumer 
was never made aware of the option to negotiate those terms. "The sum total 
of these circumstances leads to the conclusion that this contract was a 
'bargain' only in the most general sense of the word." Id. at 125. The facts of 
the case at issue closely parallel the procedural unconscionability of the A & 
M Produce case. 
In the case of Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013 
(Ariz. 1992), the Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed a one page document 
entitled on its face, "agreement to arbitrate", which was intended to require an 
individual to arbitrate her potential claims for malpractice against a physician 
and forego her right to bring that action in the courts. A photocopy of the 
document in question is found as Appendix A to the printed opinion. There 
was no deception in the presentation or format of the document and the 
17 
plaintiff could not argue "unfair surprise." The Supreme Court of Arizona, 
however, found that the waiver was a contract of adhesion. 
An adhesion contract is typically a standardized form 
offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a 
'take-it-or-leave-it' basis without affording the consumer a 
realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions 
that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or 
services except by acquiescence in the form contract. 
Id. at 1015 (citations omitted) 
In the Broemmer case, the plaintiff was a 21 year-old woman, 16 or 17 
weeks pregnant. She and her mother went to Abortion Services of Phoenix 
where she was asked to complete three forms. The forms were a two page 
consent to operate, a questionnaire and the one page agreement to arbitrate at 
issue. The agreement to arbitrate is much easier to read and comprehend than 
the Rental Delivery; however, the presentation of the agreement to arbitrate by 
the clinic to the patient was very similar to the presentation to the Rental 
Delivery by Savage to Boyd. The Rental Delivery meets all of the conditions 
necessary to consider it a contract of adhesion. 
SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY 
The second aspect of the unconscionability doctrine prevents oppression. 
The indemnification clause in the Rental Delivery gives an extremely lopsided 
advantage to Savage. Savage is attempting to place the responsibility for even 
latent defects in its equipment onto its customers. 
From a social perspective, risk of loss is most appropriately 
borne by a party best able to prevent its occurrence, 
(citations omitted) Rarely would the buyer be in a better 
position than the manufacturer - seller to evaluate the 
performance characteristics of a machine. 
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A & M Produce Co. at 125. It is also clear in the case at hand that Boyd 
would not be in a better position to evaluate the quality of the scaffolding 
t han Savage. As such, the terms of the indemnification clause are 
"inconsistent with accepted mores of commercial practice." Jones at 40. 
The facts in the instant case present even stronger arguments in favor of 
holding the Rental Delivery unenforceable than do the facts in either the 
Broemmer or A & M Produce cases. The seller of the weight-sizing machine 
attempted to exclude consequential damages incurred as a result of the 
machine's failure to operate properly. In the case at hand, Savage not only 
desires to be free from liability for its equipment's failures but also to shift the 
burden to defend it against claims by third-parties upon its customers. 
In the Broemmer case, the plaintiff was only precluded from her choice 
of forums to which she could turn for relief. The burden on Boyd is far 
greater. If the indemnification clause were to be upheld by this court, Boyd 
would have no forum to which he could turn for relief. Additionally, he would 
be required to stand in the shoes of Savage to pay for Kane's damages, the 
costs of litigation and Savage's attorneys' fees. Boyd, in this case, is an 
innocent party and the indemnification clause imposes "an overall imbalance 
in rights and responsibilities" by Savage upon its customers. Jones at 40. 
Boyd urges this court to refuse to enforce the offensive results of the Rental 
Delivery, a pre-printed form equipment check-off list which contains hidden 
19 
non-negotiated and oppressive terms. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Boyd could have taken all four sheets of the Rental Delivery 
to legal counsel for advice on whether the document contained any significant 
reallocation of risk hidden within its nearly illegible sheets, this court should 
not justify such sharp and deceptive business practices when all of the facts 
surrounding the initialing of the Rental Delivery are examined at the time 
Boyd picked up the scaffolding. Each fact and inference must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to Boyd and in an effort to prevent oppression and 
unfair surprise. Based on the foregoing, Boyd urges this court to reverse the 
trial court and hold that the "defend and indemnify clause" is unenforceable. 
DATED this 10th day of November, 1994. 
DUNN & DU 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
J. RAND HIRSCHI 
KEVIN D. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
4
 Savage's attempt to shift to its customers all risks of any nature arising from its own fault also violates the strong 
public policy embodied in the Tort Reform Act of 1986 as amended in 1993 (§78-27-38 through 43, Utah Code 
Ann.) and recognized in the Utah Supreme Court's opinion of Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 
1993): All persons, not immune, whose fault contributed to an injury are responsible for their share of fault but 
only for their share. This strong public policy should militate against the extreme reallocation that Savage attempts 
in its Rental Delivery document. See Brown v. Boyer-Washington Blvd. Associates, 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993) 
(indemnification provision did no more than state Utah comparative fault law and would not be used to shift all 
liability to sub-contractor.) 
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Tab A 
IC SECURITY PRINTERS. INC. (801) 973-6555 
SKY CLIMBER RENTAL DELIVERY 
SAVAGElScaHold & Equipment Co. 
iJA 
S C A F F O L D 
I N D U S T R Y 
/ ^ S S D C A T I O N 
728 West 2nd South 
Sales and Rental p h o n e (801) 359-8635
 W V T 1 T B T n , . .A" 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 [^ 0. 1940 
E X H I B I T " A 1 
Leased to Date 
Address Job Number 
Customer's Order No. 
Job This Agreement Terminates: Date 19_ 
Ship Via Vehicle License Number 
DESCRIPTION |" 
OATE | 
SKY CLIMBERS 1 
POWER CLIMBERS | 
LAHOS J 
SKY LOCKS 1 
STIRRUPS 1 
WORK CAGES | 
DEMOUNTABLE WORK CAGES | 
BOSUN CHAIRS | 
ROLLER BUMPERS | 
WIRE ROPES | 
WIRE ROPES | 
WIRE ROPES TIEBACKS ] 
ELECTRIC CABLES 
ELECTRIC CABLES 
ELECTRIC YOKES 
ELECTRIC 110 ADAPTERS 
SKY CLIMBER GUARD RAIL POSTS 
GUARD RAILS 
GUARD RAILS 
J-CLAMPS 
THIMBLES 
SHACKLES 
CORNICE HOOKS 
PARAPET CLAMPS 
ALUM " 1 " BEAMS 
STEEL " 1 " BEAMS 
LONGHORN ASSEMBLY 
COUNTERWEIGHTS 
ALUMINUM PLANK 
ALUMINUM PLANK 
RECEIVED | RETURNED 1 SERIAL NUMBER T 
i n n r u n i M n i 
Count equipment received. Customer liable for 
eauipment not returned. HANDLE WIRE ROPE PROPERLY CUSTOMER WILL BE 
CHARGED FOR THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF WIRE ROPE IF 
ANY PART IS DAAAAGED. 
CAUTION: SET FOR VOLTS 
USE ONLY n 10-3 ELECTRIC CABLE 
D LIFE LINES AND SAFETY BELTS DECLINED WILL 
SUPPLY OWN EQUIPMENT. / / / 
INITIAL 
SEE REVERSE SIDE WHICH PROVIDES THAT 
• LESSEE HAS INSPECTED "LEASED EQUIPMENT" AND WILL 
• WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED 
(SEE PARAGRAPH 5) 
| • LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15) | | 
• LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH 
SAFETY REGULATIONS BY ALL PERSONS (PARAGRAPH 16) 
I • LESSEE HAS RECEIVED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, IS I I 
FAMILIAR WITH EQUIPMENTS SAFE USE, AND WILL MAKE 
SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS AVAILABLE AT JOB LOCA-
I TION (PARAGRAPH 16) X / / / I I 
( SIGNATURE 
AND OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS — READ IT! 
I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE 
AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF 
RECEIPT BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER 
OR OTHER AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY 
CONSTITUTE LESSEES AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE 
PARAGRAPH 20). ( / / 
RECEIPT OF ABOVE EQUIPMENT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED 
Count Accepted By 
SIGNATURE OF LESSEE OR AUTHORIZED AGENT 
Checli :ed By f ^ [
 / 
ALL EQUIPMENT USED AT YOUR OWN RISK IF EQUIPMENT DOES NOT WORK PROPERLY. NOTIFY OFFICE AT ONCE. 
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SKY CLIMBER RENTAL DELIVERY M E M B E F* 
Leased to _ 
Address 
Job 
Ship Via . 
Scaffold & Equipment Co. ££g 
NO. 1940 
SCAFFOLD 
TRY 
^SQOCM"ION 
728 West 2nd South Salt Lake City, I I lah 84104 
Sales and Rental p h o n e (801» 359-8635 
EXHIBIT "A" 
' o ' *er \ O'der No. ,_ 
: Aureenr>~--t T, -minotesi Da te , 
h'•-'• - : . *-. -• e N -i'nber _ _ __ __. 
J 9 
DESCRIPTION \ 
DATE 
SKY CLIMBERS | 
POWER CLIMBERS 
LAHOS [ 
SKY LOCKS [ 
STIRRUPS 1 
WORK CAGES | 
DEMOUNTABLE WORK CAGES 
BOSUN CHAIRS 
ROLLER BUMPERS j 
WIRE ROPES 
WIRE ROPES 
WIRE ROPES TIEBACKS 
ELECTRIC CABLES 
ELECTRIC CABLES 
ELECTRIC YOKES 
ELECTRIC 110 ADAPTERS 
SKY CLIMBER GUARD RAIL POSTS 
GUARD RAILS 
GUARD RAILS 
J-CLAMPS 
THIMBLES 
SHACKLES 
CORNICE HOOKS 
PARAPET CLAMPS 
ALUM " 1 " BEAMS 
STEEL " 1 " BEAMS 
LONGHORN ASSEMBLY 
COUNTERWEIGHTS 
ALUMINUM PLANK 
ALUMINUM PLANK 
RECEIVED | 
. 
RETURNED! SERIAL NUMBER F U l D A D T A Ik I T 
Count equ ipment received. Customer l iab le for 
equipment not returned. 
HANDLE WIRE ROPE PROPERLY CUSTOMER WILL BE 
CHARGED FOR THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF WIRE ROPE IF 
ANY PART IS DAAAAGED 
CAUTION: SET FOR VOLTS 
USE ONLY H 10-3 ELECTRIC CABLE 
D LIFE LINES AND SAFETY BELTS DECLINED WILL 
SUPPLY OWN EQUIPMENT. / / / 
INITIAL 
SEE REVERSE SIDE WHICH PROVIDES THAT 
• LESSEE HAS INSPECTED "LEASED EQUIPMENT ," AMD Wll 1 
CONTINUE TO INSPECT IT (PARAGRAPH 3). 
• WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED I I 
(SEE PARAGRAPH 5) ' | 
1 • LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15) | 
• LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE WIT 
SAFETY REGULATIONS BY ALL PERSONS (PARAGRAPH 16) 
[ • L E S S E E HAS RECEIVED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, IS l 
FAMILIAR WITH EQUIPMENTS SAFE USE, AND WILL MAKE 
SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS AVAILABLE AT JOB LOCA 
j TION (PARAGRAPH 16) X / / / \ \ 
SIGNATURE 
AND OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS — READ IT! 
I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE 
AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF 
RECEIPT BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER 
OR OTHER AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY 
CONSTITUTE LESSEE'S AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE 
PARAGRAPH 20). t / / 
RECEIPT OF ABOVE EQUIPMENT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED 
/ 
M,, • LESSEE OR AUTHORIZED AGENT 
/ 0U1. 
ALL EQUIPMENT USED AT YOUR OWN RISK t ' K J I P M E N T DG£h fc W » K Ph . t h t M f T H ^ i ^ i T * NCE. 
SKY CLIMBER RENTAL DELIVERY 
SAVAGE /Scoff old & Equipment Co. *£gg 
NO. 1940 
SCAFFOLD 
nrf-Tv 
^ s s o c i k r o N 
728 West 2nd South Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Sales and Rental p h o n e («>l) 359-8635 E X H I B I T " A " 
Leased to Date 
Address , Job Number 
Customer's Order No. 
Job This Agreement Terminates: Date_ 19_ 
Ship Via Vehicle License Number 
DESCRIPTION 
SKY CLIMBERS 
POWER CLIMBERS 
LAHOS 
SKY LOCKS 
STIRRUPS 
WORK CAGES 
DEMOUNTABLE WORK CAGES 
BOSUN CHAIRS 
ROLLER BUMPERS 
WIRE ROPES 
WIRE ROPES 
WIRE ROPES TIEBACKS 
ELECTRIC CABLES 
ELECTRIC CABLES 
ELECTRIC YOKES 
ELECTRIC 110 ADAPTERS 
SKY CLIMBER GUARD RAIL POSTS 
GUARD RAILS 
GUARD RAILS 
J-CLAMPS 
THIMBLES 
SHACKLES 
CORNICE HOOKS 
PARAPET CLAMPS 
RECEIVED RETURNED 
ALUM " I " BEAMS 
STEEL " I " BEAMS 
LONGHORN ASSEMBLY 
COUNTERWEIGHTS 
ALUMINUM PLANK 
SERIAL NUMBER IMPORTANT 
Count equipment received. Customer liable for 
eauipment not returned. 
HANDLE WIRE ROPE PROPERLY CUSTOMER WILL BE 
CHARGED FOR THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF WIRE ROPE IF 
ANY PART IS DAMAGED. 
CAUTION: SET FOR VOLTS 
USE ONLY » 10-3 ELECTRIC CABLE 
D LIFE LINES AND SAFETY BELTS DECLINED WILL 
SUPPLY OWN EQUIPMENT. __^/___ 
INITIAL 
SEE REVERSE SIDE WHICH PROVIDES THAT 
LESSEE HAS INSPECTED "LEASED EQUIPMENT" AND WILL 
CONTINUE TO INSPECT IT (PARAGRAPH 3) 
WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED 
(SEE PARAGRAPH 5) 
• LESSEE WILL REPORT ALL ACCIDENTS (PARAGRAPH 6) 
• LESSEE WILL DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY LESSOR (PARAGRAPH 15) 
LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH 
SAFETY REGULATIONS BY ALL PERSONS (PARAGRAPH 16) 
LESSEE HAS RECEIVED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, IS 
FAMILIAR WITH EQUIPMENT'S SAFE USE, AND WILL MAKE 
SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS AVAILABLE AT JOB LOCA-
TION (PARAGRAPH 16) X • / 
SIGNATURE 
AND OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS — READ IT! 
I HAVE READ THE TERMS ON THIS AND THE REVERSE SIDE 
AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE SAME. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF 
RECEIPT BELOW BY LESSEE'S EMPLOYEE, AGENT, TEAMSTER 
OR OTHER AUTHORIZED PERSON SHALL CONCLUSIVELY 
CONSTITUTE LESSEE'S AGREEMENT TO THIS LEASE (SEE 
PARAGRAPH 20). ' / 
RECEIPT OF ABOVE EQUIPMENT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED 
Count Accepted By 
5533 
SIGNATURE OF LESSEE OR AUTHORIZED AGENT 
00111 
Checked By_ 
GIVE TO SCAFFOLD ERECTOR & USER OR POST ON JOB 
DEVELOPED FOR INDUSTRY BY 
SCAFFOLD INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, INC. 
CODE OF SAFE PRACTICES 
FOR 
SUSPENDED POWERED SCAFFOLDS 
It shall be the responsibility of all employees and users to read and comply with the following common sense rules which are designed to 
promote safety in the erection and use of suspended powered scaffolds. These rules do not purport to be all inclusive nor to supplant or 
replace other additional safety and precautionary measures to cover usual or unusual conditions. If these rules conflict in any way with any 
state, local or federal statute or regulation, said statute or regulation shall supersede these rules and it shall be the responsibility of each 
employee and user to comply therewith. 
A. GENERAL RULES: 
1. POST THESE SAFETY RULES at every job site in a conspicuous place and make certain that all persons who will erect, 
use, relocate, or dismantle suspended svstems are fullv aware of them and other governing codes. 
2. READ, UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOW THESE RULES and manufacturers' instructions located in manuals supplied with and 
on plates posted on scaffolding equipment. 
3. CONSULT YOUR SUSPENDED POWER SCAFFOLD EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER when in doubt. 
4. OPERATE SAFELY —NEVER TAKE CHANCES. 
B. EQUIPMENT: 
1. Use only suspended scaffolding system and personal 
safety equipment designed for the specific job operation. 
2. Use equipment only in manner specified by equipment 
manufacturers. 
3- Never use equipment that does not function properly. 
4. Clean and maintain equipment as specified by equip-
ment manufacturer. Contact supplier for required service. 
5. Never alter, remove or substitute components of a 
scaffold system. 
6. Make sure that platforms have toeboards, rails and 
other enclosure items which meet governing 
requirements, and are properly installed and secured. 
C. INSPECTION: 
1. Inspect all suspension and operators' safety equipment, 
before installation, each day before use and after mov-
ing to new drop location, for damage and that it meets 
manufacturer's operational performance and safety 
standards. 
2. Inspect wire rope each ascent and descent to insure that 
it has not been damaged. 
D. INSTALLATION: 
1. Safe rigging installation is your responsibility. 
2. Roof irons, hooks, parapet clamps, outrigger beams, or 
other rope supporting devices shall be capable of carry-
ing the maximum applied loads with a safety factor of 
not less than 4:1. The strength of the building or struc-
ture to which such equipment is to be attached or on 
which it will rest, must be verified by a competent per-
son prior to installation. 
3. Tiebacks having strength equivalent to the hoisting 
ropes shall be installed without slack at right angles to 
the building and be firmly secured to a structurally 
sound portion of the structure. This structure shall 
have the capability of supporting the maximum 
suspended load with a safety factor of not less than 4;1. 
In the event that the tieback cannot be installed at 
right angles to the structure face, two tiebacks, 
without slack, shall be attached to each rope suppor-
ting device to prevent movement in any direction. 
4. When outrigger beams are used for rope support, the 
inner end shall be restrained against vertical move-
ment so that the beam is capable of supporting safely 
the maximum applied rope load with a safety factor of 
not less than 4:1. If counter-weights are used for beam 
restraint, they shall be of a non-flowable material, shall 
carry a weight value and be securely fastened to the 
beam. 
5. When using traction type hoisting machines make sure 
that the wire rope is long enough to reach from the 
highest point of support to the lowest point of building 
structure plus rigging reeving lengths as defined in the 
hoisting machine manufacturer's instructions. 
6. When using drum wrapping hoisting machines make 
sure that at least four wraps remain on the drum at the 
lowest point of descent, and the end of the rope is 
securely attached to the drum. 
7. On two point suspension scaffolds make sure that the 
stirrups are directly under the suspension points. 
E. WIRE ROPE: 
1. Use only the wire rope and fittings specified by the 
hoisting machine manufacturer. 
2. Use the number of wire rope clamps and tighten clamps 
in accordance with hoisting machine manufacturer's 
instructions. Before commencing work operations, 
preload wire rope with maximum work load, then 
retighten clamps to manufacturer's torque specifica-
tions. Check clamp tightening daily. 
3. Inspect wire rope for damage daily. Do not use kinked, 
bird-caged, corroded, undersize, or damaged wire rope. 
4. Clean and lubricate wire rope in accordance with 
manufacturer's instructions. 
5. Handle wire rope with care — coil and uncoil properly. 
Do not drop coiled or uncoiled wire rope on ground 
from any height. 
6. Do not expose wire rope to fire, undue heat, corrosive 
atmosphere or chemicals, to passage of electrical 
currents. 
7. When welding on suspended scaffolds protect the wire 
rope from the welding torch or electrode. Make sure 
the platform is grounded and stray electrical currents 
cannot pass thru the suspension rope to ground thru 
the upper rope support or by contact of the rope with 
building structure or the ground. 
F. SAFETY: 
1. Always use safety belts attached by shortest effective 
lanyards and rope grabbing device to lifeline rigged to a 
separate building support point capable of carrying 
loads defined in governing regulations. 
2. When working or riding on suspended scaffolds main-
tain the lanyard attachment to the lifeline at the 
highest point compatible with work movement. 
3. The weight of men, work materials and components 
mounted on the scaffold must not exceed the manufac-
turer's rated loads. 
4. Two or more scaffolds must not be combined into one 
by lapping platforms on one stirrup. 
5. Do not overload the support rope. 
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SUSPENDED SCAFFOLD 
cRE-OPERATION CHECK-O" US' 
IT IS EXPECTED THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY TRAINED 
BEFORE VCU CAN BE ASKED TO FOLLOW TH!S CHECK-OFF LIST 
a~c:1 ' r r just r . ' •'•" ?«.:•• "ic-.tion 
> r f 4 . n _ . . . . . . ^ : n ^ ?nt,*V.j 
u p ; ^ - o r -C- iEMrS - Cont'd. 
'•-• '(•..-• : s applied. 3l: tatings ^o^^ oeO''1 checked a- tioh;oess 
a oKa ic :! cable cr air hose connections have been inspected ana 
a ?a" -.":. Strain :" i^!?f has bean provided 
*? :'••. • • .' to he asec is aoeaoare 'or the hoist and distance >rcm 'be 
S-Ji — CRT SA'STLiM 
• roe s'n.; aa^-- >~ sun-ae- te .support -h o :0? 
» The ;;c-!-o*:'-. •••>? »ooe 3 idequaioh a-an ioa:t.'d 
• Tr.r- 0Li''']pc .J ot riT?e»' design a.oa ^ ar-~a!y "ssembi.-d 
• foe numner of aoun'e'V/e:g'-ts are nb~au ae fa' *he overhsr.;} lend 
• Al< ^ -ar -a r:-;-r^c" a a ocoks are adoou-"0!*/ v -d ba :k 
• Sc::<et:: aid aavifc >re ocn-eci!y s e a l e d 
SUSPENSION UNIT 
» A1 ecrneonenls rails, 'anas deck. bumoe r ol' 5. v-:V!s. "avasctic' ' 
foe aoa"bs aaardra;'a stanchions'; of 'he sraor, eaae o-e'r aave 
been oh .'Ckf-"j 'c orvaae they are sauna and W'{' r ,o f .veak or r^-me 
iccse 
•
 Tf e stlanos o. conn rations and the" com pent, a is have been checked 
fc ensure th>-v are safe 
• The cacacitv iJentifioaticr. shews the ma^mum 'oae and ;t vil! not be 
;3xceeoed 
•
 T i • • • ; -?tese >u:?ceiiSiOH cants are in iee with She rco; sacpod? 
HOiST COMPONENTS 
-;ad and under-
3er operating :oncit'cn 
nr! e :n.Tit» d to 
- nave !oca:\c ,o maii-tenanco too v ? ;r 
^tee' .a-e ace -i.:s been ' u ro^ roc . ;•;.•.--• 
•".' p: ae: .tnd ana :j':8 
:
-: *c/'h of j iee: ,v!'-» rape is suffieior.* 'o reaa' ; la- ""round and is 
oat-d :-~' vne : c - 'upport ano excevs :rnp'-r-y coited at 'r\ a ground 
* ' a ;;.-..; s jcrr-.-ct'y attached to the stirrup 
FALL ^hFEST SYSTEM 
MGTc: ivJo person shall enter a stage / cage chair unless aach 
paraco nav "aooked-up" in a safe manner, 
*
 r
.' 'ch ^.T'iOf to as-1 m^ cteae once ' chair has ti• ar ova mdecenaent 
• E..-0-' --.-'I'hj.'C lite Sne has been totally shocked 'or -are asa and s 
:C're::!v ^-ai-inatrd at an 'ndeaeido'a . r-itfe anchor - c o 1 "t rco: !a.<^ 
Foot - o r e prc'actioc has {z-^'} c o v d e d 
• E-tca aa: c- grab has been ch^c:< -.J ?cr o^rrec* operation j,-;d instailaiion 
• Eacli fad! body harness or belt has been thoroughly checked fo ensure 
that a!' corriDonents are safe 
» E?^ !aryard has been thoroughly checked for safe condition. The cooa-
O'.nants are sound and correctly attached to the rope grab and D ring a* 
the :onio<- of the back 
* The body names 3 or h,ci|f is l i e proper size and fits •x?rrect'y and is 
-noa x> 'he -cdy 
ADOIT!Orj;\L RESPONSIBILITIES 
• Ti^e i-iqippaasnl nu;at be kepJ c:ear of power sources and oostacles 
• The -quiUKrvait ^as t not be used Ir adve rse wea*her conditions 
* Tho ro!ai r: 'oira "^ost be chocked each time you use :r rnovo u 
• Aiv/ayo an -.-mbftr a.ci to overload the equipment 
- 'r-n^dia-'e -aoor any indication ot improper operation 
REMEM35F 
IF IN OOUBT. ASK. 
IP % C U ^ 3AF3TY EQUIPMENT Si" ON THE STAGE 
O 
O 
Tahlt 
SEP 2 1 i s ; SEP 1 6 1S93 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
mi 1 i "in i i i ' II III mi i i inr nun "i/y. imvvu 11 II i \\\i r 
..ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Brivj A, L,^\ ~ , 
vs . 
J . R. S imp 1 o t Comp any, a f I :  a da corporation, and Savage 
Scaffold & Equipment , Tnc , 
a Utah corporat ion., 
Defendants. 
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BOYD V. SIMPLOT PAGE TAD MINUTE ENTRY 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Savage's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this \jf__ day of September, 1993. 
fl 
Michael R. Murphy 
District Court Judge 
RM\I ' IMI'I I II PA<il' THRFF. MINUTE ENTRY 
vtAH iv4TJ CERTIFICATE 
I h e r eb y c e r t i f y ... ilnl i iiuc nnd v. ..v.; ..... . . . e 
foregoing Minute Entry, postage pi^paid, to the following on this 
day of September, '993. 
Daniel Bay Gibbons 
KIRTCN, MXCNKIE & POELMATS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Mark D. Dunn 
DUNN & DUNN 
230 South 500 _ , . , I 
Salt Lake Ci ty Utah 
David R. King 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorney for Defendant Simplot 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 Wes t Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Scott W. Christensen 
HANSON, EPPERSCN & SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant Savage Scaffold 
4 Triad Center, Sui te 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
David w. v^aii trill 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN &. KING 
P. O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 8370x 
TabC 
Peter C. Collins (#0700) 
John W. Holt (#5720) 
WINDER £ HASLAMf P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite #4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
ROBERT J. KANE, JR. and : 
BEVERLY KANE, : AMENDED COMPLAINT 
: (Jury Demand Renewed) 
Plaintiffs, : 
-v- : 
J. R. SIMPLOT COMPANY, a : Civil No, 92-C-234S 
Nevada corporation, and : 
SAVAGE SCAFFOLD & EQUIPMENT, : Judge David Sam 
INC*, a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, and as and for 
their Amended Complaint, complain of defendants and allege as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Robert J. Kane, Jr. and Beverly Kane are 
husband and wife and residents and citizens of the State of 
Delaware. 
2. Defendant J. R. Simplot Company ("Simplot") is a 
Nevada corporation and a corporate resident and citizen of a 
state other than the State of Utah, with its principal place of 
business in the State of Idaho; Simplot has, at all times 
material hereto, (1) transacted substantial business within the 
State of Utah; and (2) contracted to supply goods and/or 
services in the State of Utah* 
3. Defendant Savage Scaffold & Equipment, Inc. ("Sav-
age") is a Utah corporation and a corporate resident and 
citizen of the State of Utah, with its principal place of 
business located in the State of Utah. 
4. The matter in controversy herein exceeds the value of 
$50,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §1332(a). 
6. Venue is properly laid in this Court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1391. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence of Defendant Simplot) 
7. Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-
rate, in this First Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs 1 
through 6. 
8. At the time of the subject accident (which occurred 
on July 5, 1991) and for a substantial period of time prior 
thereto, defendant Simplot owned and/or otherwise controlled 
real property located in Burley, Idaho, on which were located 
improvements including grain silos owned and operated by 
defendant Simplot. 
2 
9. On July 5, 1991, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was 
working in the employ of an entity that is not a party to this 
suit, in connection with a contract with defendant Simplot to 
paint some or all of defendant Simplot's silos located on the 
subject property. 
10. In connection with and in the course of his said 
employment, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was, on July 5, 1991, 
and for a period of weeks prior thereto, participating in the 
painting of the said silos. 
11. Plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was, in connection with 
his said employment, on July 5, 1991, and for a period of weeks 
prior thereto, a business invitee of defendant Simplot, and, as 
such, was a person to whom defendant Simplot owed (1) the duty 
of reasonable care, including the duty to keep the subject 
premises reasonably safe in connection with plaintiff Robert J. 
Kane, Jr.'s presence on, use of, and work on the subject 
premises; and (2) the duties of refraining from allowing the 
subject premises to become and to remain unsafe, in connection 
with plaintiff Robert J. Kane's presence on, use of, and work 
on the subject premises. 
12. In connection with the painting of one of the said 
silos ("the subject silo") plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. and 
his boss and co-worker, one Bruce Boyd, utilized a scaffolding 
device which was suspended by two cables attached to structures 
located on the top of the subject silo. 
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13. Defendant Simplotf beginning at a time presently 
unknown to plaintiffs and continuing through the time of the 
subject accident, by and through one or more of its agents, 
negligently breached its aforesaid duties to plaintiff Robert 
J. Kane, Jr., by, inter alia, (1) allowing a certain catwalk to 
become and remain unsafely and unsecurely affixed to the top of 
the subject silo; (2) failing adequately to warn plaintiff 
Robert J. Kane, Jr. of the danger inherent in working on the 
subject scaffolding device while it was suspended from the 
catwalk; (3) permitting one of the supporting cables of the 
subject scaffolding device to become and remain attached to 
that catwalk, when and while Simp lot knew or should have known 
that that catwalk was not securely affixed to the subject silo 
and was unsafe for use as a structure from which scaffolding 
devices such as the subject scaffolding device might be sus-
pended; and (4) allowing workers, including plaintiff Robert J. 
Kane, Jr., to work on the subject scaffolding device while it 
was suspended from the subject catwalk. 
14. Defendant Simplot, by and through one or more of its 
agents, knew or should have known that one or more workers, 
including plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr., might be, would 
reasonably be expected to be, would be, and/or was or were in 
fact working on the subject scaffolding device while the 
subject scaffolding device was suspended from the subject 
catwalk. 
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15. On July 5, 1991, as plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was 
engaged in employment activities in connection with the paint-
ing of the silo, and while plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. was 
standing on the subject scaffolding device (while it was 
suspended from the said catwalk) , the said catwalk was, as a 
proximate result of Simplot's negligence, suddenly pulled loose 
from the top of the silo, causing plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. 
to fall approximately 60 feet to the ground. 
16. As further proximate results of the negligence of 
defendant Simplot, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. has suffered 
severe, serious, debilitating, disfiguring and permanent bodily 
injuries; he suffered substantial physical, mental and emotion-
al pain and suffering; has suffered substantial inconvenience 
in, loss of, and diminution of enjoyment of various life 
activities; has suffered lost income to date in an amount to be 
proved at trial; has incurred medical and related expenses to 
date in an amount to be proved at trial; will, in the future, 
incur substantial additional medical and related expenses and 
substantial additional loss of income and earning capacity; and 
will, in the future, suffer substantial mental, emotional, and 
physical pain and suffering, continuing substantial impairment 
and disability, continuing substantial inconvenience in, loss 
of, and diminution of enjoyment of various life activities — 
all to his damage in amounts, substantially greater than 
$500,000.00 for his special damages and substantially greater 
5 
than $500,000.00 for his general damages, to be determined by 
the jury herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Strict Liability of Defendant Savage) 
17. Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-
rate, in this Second Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs 
1-16. 
18. Defendant Savage has, at all times material hereto, 
been engaged in the business of the provision, sale, and rental 
(to contractors, subcontractors, and others) of scaffolding 
equipment and systems. 
19. Prior to the subject accident, defendant Savage 
provided, sold, and rented, from its Salt Lake City business 
premises, to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.7s aforesaid boss and 
co-worker, Bruce Boyd, the subject scaffolding equipment and 
system (including but not limited to the aforesaid scaffolding 
device) used in connection with painting of defendant Simplot's 
subject silo. 
20. The subject scaffolding equipment and system, and/or 
one or more component parts thereof, as designed and sold 
and/or rented by Savage to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.'s said 
boss and co-worker, was, at all times and in all respects 
material hereto, when it left defendant Savage's possession, 
the time of the subject accident, and at all intervening times, 
in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to its 
users, including plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. 
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21. The defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of 
the subject scaffolding equipment and system included but was 
not limited to the failure to include adequate warnings and 
instructions regarding the use of the subject scaffolding 
equipment and system; and the design of the subject scaffolding 
equipment and system, which made it virtually impossible and, 
from plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.'s perspective, unsafe, for 
plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. to do the silo painting work 
which he was doing when the subject incident occurred, without 
unhooking from his "safety line," which was an integral part of 
the subject scaffolding equipment and system. 
22. The subject scaffolding equipment and system was used 
for the purposes for which it was intended and was not altered 
from the time it left defendant Savage's possession through the 
time of the subject accident. 
23. As proximate results of defendant Savage's said 
provision, sale, and rental of the subject scaffolding equip-
ment and system, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. has suffered and 
sustained the injuries and damages described hereinabove; and 
defendant Savage is strictly liable in tort, to plaintiff 
Robert J. Kane, Jr., in the amount of damages proved at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence of Defendant Savage) 
24. Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-
rate, in this Third Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs 
1-23. 
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25. Defendant Savage owed to persons including plaintiff 
Robert J. Kane, Jr. a duty of reasonable care in connection 
with the design of and in connection with the provision, 
rental, and sale, to the said Bruce Boyd, of the subject scaf-
folding equipment and system and in connection with the giving 
of instructions and directions and warnings regarding the use 
thereof. 
26. Defendant Savage in a negligent manner and in breach 
of its duty to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. designed and 
provided, rented and sold the subject scaffolding equipment and 
system to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.'s aforesaid boss and 
co-worker, Bruce Boyd. 
27. Defendant Savage was also negligent and also breached 
its duty to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. by reason of and in 
connection with its failure adequately to direct, instruct, and 
warn the said Boyd and plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. with 
respect to the dangers inherent in, and with respect to the 
proper method for, the use of the subject scaffolding equipment 
and system. 
28. As proximate results of defendant Savage's negli-
gence, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. has suffered and sustained 
the injuries and damages described herein above; and defendant 
Savage is liable in negligence, to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, 
Jr., in the amount of damages proved at trial. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Plaintiff Beverly Kane's Loss of Consortium) 
29. Plaintiffs reallege and, by this reference, incorpo-
rate, in this Fourth Cause of Action, the foregoing paragraphs 
1-28. 
30. Defendants owed plaintiff Beverly Kane legal duties 
like the duties they owed to plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr.; by 
virtue of the acts and omissions referenced and complained of 
hereinabove, they breached those duties and thereby caused 
plaintiff Beverly Kane to suffer damage to and loss of consor-
tium with her husband, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr. 
31. As further proximate results of defendants' acts and 
omissions referenced and complained of hereinabove, plaintiff 
Beverly Kane has been substantially and permanently damaged, by 
reason of and in connection with her loss of consortium with 
her husband, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr., and in connection 
with all legally relevant aspects of that loss of consortium, 
including but not limited to loss of and diminution of compan-
ionship, society and affection, and loss of and diminution of 
enjoyment of various aspects of her relationship with her 
husband, plaintiff Robert J. Kane, Jr., all to her damages, in 
a substantial and reasonable amount, to be determined by the 
jury herein. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants 
as follows: 
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1. As and for their special damages, in reasonable and 
substantial amounts, substantially in excess of $500,000.00, to 
be proved at the trial hereof and determined by the jury 
herein; 
2. As and for their general damages, in substantial and 
reasonable amounts, substantially in excess of $500,000.00, to 
be proved at the trial hereof and determined by the jury 
herein; 
3. For all allowable interest, at the maximum statutory 
or other rate or rates, on their damages; 
4. For their just costs of court incurred herein; and 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court in its 
discretion deems just^nd proper. 
&Z-~9< d DATED this c*-~**- dav of October, 1992. 
WINDER &THASI^M, P.C. 
Peter C. Collins 
John W. Holt 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 RECEIVED 
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SLC CLAIMS 
RENEWAL OF JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, hereby renew 
their demand for trial by jury herein. 
DATED this <gK^ "*C day of October, 1992, 
WINDER/^ /fevSlSfcK, P.C. 
By. 
Peter C. Collins 
John W. Holt 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATB^OF MAILING 
I certify that on the S day of October, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Com-
plaint (Jury Demand Renewed) to be mailed first class, postage 
pre-paid to: 
Daniel A. Miller, Esq. 
J. R. Simplot Company 
One Capital Center 
999 Main Street, Suite 13 00 
Post Office Box 27 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
David R. King, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David W. Cantrill, Esq. 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
Post Office Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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